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NOTES
Eisenstadt v. Baird: Massachusetts Statute Prohibiting
Distribution of Contraceptives to Unmarried Persons
Held Unconstitutional
William Baird was arrested and held for violating a Massachusetts law
which prohibited the exhibition and distribution of contraceptives, but allowed
the distribution to married persons by either a physician or a pharmacist.1
Following Baird's conviction in state court, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
set aside the conviction for the exhibition of contraceptive devices as being
violative of Baird's first amendment rights, but sustained the conviction for
distribution.! Baird's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was dismissed in
federal district court.! The court of appeals vacated the dismissal and directed
that the writ be granted, holding, inter alia, that the Massachusetts statute was
an arbitrary and discriminatory prohibition on contraception per se.4 The
Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction.' Held,
affirmed: The Massachusetts statute banning distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried persons constitutes a prohibition on contraception per se, which
violates the rights of single persons under the equal protection clause of the

fourteenth amendment. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
I. THE ANTI-CONTRACEPTION EXPERIENCE

The Massachusetts law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives has
remained virtually unchanged since its enactment in 1879. As originally enacted, the law stated that "[wjhoever sells, lends, gives away, exhibits, or
offers to sell, lend or give away an instrument . . . drug, medicine or article
whatever for the prevention of conception or for causing unlawful abortion

I MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (1966) provides that except for the provisions
in § 21A, anyone who distributes, exhibits, advertises, or manufactures a drug, medicine,
instrument, or article designed to prevent conception or cause unlawful abortion is guilty
of a felony.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 21A (1966) provides an exception to § 21 under
which (1) a physician may prescribe such articles to a married person who may obtain
the same from a registered pharmacist, and (2) a public health clinic, registered nurse, or
maternity health clinic operated in an accredited hospital may furnish information with
respect to such articles to married persons.
Baird's arrest occurred at the termination of a lecture which included a display of various
contraceptive devices and an explanation of their respective merits. During the address,
Baird stated that he knew he was violating the state law and was inviting arrest. At the
close of the discussion, Baird invited the audience to come forward and help themselves to
the assorted contraceptive articles, whereupon he handed a presumably unmarried woman a
package of contraceptive foam.
'Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 247 N.E.2d 574 (1969).
3
Baird v. Eisenstadt, 310 F. Supp. 951 (D. Mass. 1970). The district court stated that
Baird's act of giving the contraceptive device to the young woman "added nothing to the
understanding of the lecture and was not in exercise of a right guaranteed under the First
Amendment." Id. at 954. It was further held that the statute had a legitimate purpose in
safeguarding the health of the members of the community and was not unconstitutionally
vague.
4
Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970). The court held that the statute
in question "did not bear a real and substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or
some other phase of general welfare" and was void. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 537 (1934); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
5
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 401 U.S. 934 (1971).
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.. . is guilty of a felony."' Literature which advertised contraceptive devices
or otherwise informed the public of any means by which conception might
be prevented was held to be obscene and too indecent to be spread upon the
records.! Later, however, the regulation of obscenity as a legitimate purpose
of the statute was disregarded."
An early attempt to create judicial exceptions in the statute for physicians
and those acting under physician's instructions was fruitless.' The 1879 statute
was interpreted and enforced as enacted until 1940, when it was held that
there could not be a conviction for the sale of an article susceptible of use to
prevent disease as well as for contraception without proof that, in a particular
case, a contraceptive use was intended."
A most important step in the erosion of the constitutionality of laws prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives was taken in 1965 by the United
States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, which held that a Connecticut statute forbidding the use and giving of advice on contraceptives violated
the right of marital privacy. 1 This decision prompted a revision in the Massachusetts law which created a class of individuals (physicians, pharmacists,
and married persons) who were to have access to contraceptives. Unmarried
individuals, however, were still excluded."
In a suit by several physicians for declaratory relief, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court later held that the regulation of the private sexual lives of
single persons was a legitimate subject of state concern, and that unmarried
individuals were still to be excluded from the provisions of the law allowing
distribution of contraceptives to married persons." Thus, although an exception had been added allowing the distribution of contraceptives to married
persons by physicians and pharmacists, the original prohibitory statute was
basically intact at the time Commonwealth v. Baird4 was decided. Having
commented on the fact that obscenity was no longer an issue, the court in
Commonwealth v. Baird stated that "a statute preventing distribution by in6
Law of May 10, 1879, ch. 159, § 1, [1879] Mass. Laws 1; see note 10 infra, and
accompanying text.
7
Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 265 (1917). It was held that the
statute was not in contravention of any portion of the constitution since its purpose was
to protect purity, preserve chastity, encourage continence, and defend the sanctity of the
home. Id. at 266.
'See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (prurient interests test for
obscenity accepted); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraceptive material
held not to be obscene); Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 247 N.E.2d 574 (1969)
(construction of more recent Supreme Court decisions on obscenity held binding in
Massachusetts).
9
Commonwealth v. Gardener, 300 Mass. 372, 15 N.E.2d 222 (1938). The court in
this case interpreted the statute as "sweeping, absolute and devoid of ambiguity . . . with
nothing in the circumstances of the case at bar or in the history of the statute, to support
the conclusion that physicians . . . were intended to be excepted from the operation of
the statute." Id. at 223.
" Commonwealth v. Corbett, 307 Mass. 7, 29 N.E.2d 151 (1940). See also Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 247 N.E.2d 574 (1969).
" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court found that the right of
marital privacy was "within the penumbra of specific guaranties of the Bill of Rights." Id.
at 48 1-86.
12MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21A (1966); see note 1 supra.
13 Sturgis v. Attorney General, 260 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Mass. 1970).
54355 Mass. 746, 247 N.E.2d 574 (1969).
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discriminate persons is [not] beyond legislative power."" The constitutionality
of the portion of the statute which prohibited the distribution of contraceptives was upheld. However, the portion of the statute which prohibited exhibition was held to be unconstitutional as applied to Baird on the ground that
it violated his right of speech as guaranteed by the first amendment."6 Thus,
the statute was no longer intact, and an important step had been taken toward
liberalizing the statute's judicial interpretation.
II. THE

EISENSTADT APPROACH IN PERSPECTIVE

In Eisenstadt v. Baird the appellant contended that Baird "did not have
standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives because he was neither an authorized distributor nor a single person
unable to obtain contraceptives."" Noting that the "case or controversy" requirement of article III of the Constitution had been met, Justice Brennan,
in delivering the opinion of the Court, agreed that relaxation of the Court's
self-imposed rule against allowing litigants to advance the rights of third
parties was required. In Griswold v. Connecticut" this rule was relaxed in
order that physicians who had prescribed the use of contraceptives to married
persons might have standing to assert the constitutional rights of the patients
with whom they had a professional relationship. Following this precedent to its
logical conclusion, the Eisenstadt Court saw no reason why Baird, who was
convicted under a statute which was not a health measure,'" should be prevented, because he was neither a doctor nor a druggist, from asserting his
right as an advocate of those persons who desired to obtain contraceptives.'
The Court decided the issue of standing in favor of Baird, reasoning that because "unmarried persons [were] denied access to contraceptives in Massachusetts, they were [not] themselves subject to prosecution and, to that extent,
[were] denied a forum in which to assert their own rights.""
Having determined the issue of standing, the Court sought to determine
whether a legislative purpose existed which would explain the discriminatory
treatment accorded the class of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives under Massachusetts law. The Court concluded that no such legitimate purpose existed. 2 The object of the statute as a deterrent to premarital
1 247

N.E.2d at 578.

16 /d.

'405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
"1381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9 In Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970), the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit determined that the statute under which Baird was convicted was not a
health measure, implying that the statute's provision for a physician's role was unnecessary.
See text accompanying note 28 infra.
"0See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1963) (standing accorded third party because those who suffered under the law had no forum in which to assert their rights);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (seller under a racially restrictive convenant
has standing to assert equal protection rights of non-Caucasian purchasers).
1'405 U.S. at 446. The Court stated: "In fact, the case for according standing to
asserted third party rights is stronger in this regard here than in Griswold" because a
proper forum for single persons desiring to obtain contraceptives would otherwise be denied
since they are not subject to prosecution as were users of contraceptives under the Connecticut statute in Griswold.
" 405 U.S. at 447.
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sexual activity was attacked by the Court as unreasonable in light of the fact
that contraceptives were distributed to married individuals without regard to
their prospective use."3 In addition, the Court noted that the distribution of
contraceptives for the prevention of disease was not regulated.' The Court
alsocompared the sentence for distributing contraceptives with the sentence
for fornication, a misdemeanor, and found that the former punishment was
twenty times greater than the ninety-day sentence of the latter. The Court
agreed with the opinion of the court of appeals that Massachusetts had
chosen to expose the aider and abetter who simply gives away a contraceptive
to twenty times the sentence of the user. Since contraceptives were distributed
in Massachusetts without regard to their intended use, and since birth control
devices for the prevention of disease were not regulated by statute, the Court
concluded that there was little in the way of a deterrent to premarital sex in
either section of the Massachusetts law. Since the status of the offender was
preferable to the status of the aider and abetter of fornication under Massachusetts law, the Court further concluded that the deterrence of premarital
sex could not be the legitimate purpose of the legislation.'
The Court similarly attacked the interpretation of the legislative aim of
the Massachusetts statute advanced by the court in Commonwealth v. Baird.2"
The Massachusetts Supreme Court had stated that the purpose of the statute
was to "prevent the distribution of articles designed to prevent conception
which may have undesirable, if not dangerous, physical consequences." ' The
Eisenstadt Court found, however, that if the interest in the public health was
to be served, the state could not discriminate against the unmarried. Neither
could the Court agree with appellant's contention that all contraceptives are
potentially dangerous. The Court concluded, accordingly, that, "despite the
statute's superficial earmarks as a health measure, health, on the face of the
statute, may no more reasonably be regarded as its purpose than the deterrence
of premarital sexual relations."'
Having determined that the legislative purpose of the statute was neither
to promote health nor to deter fornication, the Court found that the constitutionality of the statute could be sustained, if at all, solely as a prohibition on
contraception per se.29 The Court, agreeing with the decision of the court of
appeals on this issue, decided that to consider contraceptives immoral, in and
of themselves, and to forbid their distribution to single persons would conflict
with the fundamental human rights of individuals to avoid unwanted pregnancy.' In addition, the Court found that such action would constitute an
over-extension of the legislative powers of the state."'
Thus, rather than taking a new approach in resolving the constitutionality
of the Massachusetts anti-contraception statute, the Court in Eisenstadt ex3

1Id. at 449.
Id. at 448-49.
Id. at 449.

14
25

26355

Mass. 746, 247 N.E.2d 574 (1969).

17247 N.E.2d at 578.
11405 U.S. at 452.
29

Id.

1Id. at 453.
11Id. at 452.
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upon the judicial technique employed earlier in Griswold v. ConnectiGriswold the Court brought the controversy surrounding the contraissue within the protection afforded by the Bill of Rights." In deliveropinion of the Court in Eisenstadt, Justice Brennan stated:

It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the
marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with
a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with
a separate intellectual and emotional make-up. If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
The Court thus used the Griswold approach to show that specific guarantees
of the Constitutions enable both married and unmarried persons to be similarly situated with respect to the choice of bearing or not bearing children.
In line with this reasoning, the Eisenstadt Court employed the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment' to invalidate the Massachusetts
statute which provided "dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated."'"
Although the decision in Eisenstadt is of great importance, it should not
be offered as a significant development in constitutional interpretation. Griswold had broken the ice on the constitutional question surrounding anticontraception legislation in holding that a statute forbidding the use of
contraceptives by married persons was unconstitutional. Eisenstadt extends the
Griswold analysis to declare unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to the unmarried. 7 In attacking the constitutionality
of the statute by systematically disposing of the legislative purposes behind it,
Eisenstadt narrows the possibility of future state legislation seeking to circumvent its ruling, and, as such, is justified in resolving novel constitutional questions through a borrowed but effective judicial technique.'
"2381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965). A Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives was held violative of the right of marital privacy guaranteed penumbrally
through the Bill of Rights.
"405 U.S. at 453.
'" U.S. CONST. amend. IV states in part: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... See also note 32 supra.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 states in part: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property . . . ; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Griswold interpreted the guarantees under
the fourteenth amendment to mean that Connecticut could not enact legislation which
would enable state government to encroach upon the privacy of the marriage.
'U.S.

CONST. amend XIV.
at 454-55.
'Id. at 460 (White & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the result). Justices White and
Blackmun noted that a similar result would obtain in the case without having to resort to
novel constitutional arguments. Since there was no evidence of the marital status of the
young woman to whom Baird handed the contraceptive, both Justices agreed that such a
flaw in the record would be a sufficient ground for reversal.
"'For an interesting discussion of the respective merits of the several approaches to this
question, see 84 HARv. L. REV. 1525 (1971). See also 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 221 (1971).
36405

U.S.

